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Sammendrag:. Det er store forskjeller mellom 
industrilandene med tanke på hvor vanskelig det vil bli 
å oppfylle forpliktelsene under Kyotoprotokollen. 
Land med høye reduksjonskostnader er spesielt 
interessante fordi de kan sees på som ”testtilfeller” for 
andre land i eventuelle framtidige, mer ambisiøse 
klimaavtaler. Vi går ut ifra at et lands mål er å utvikle 
en effektiv klimapolitikk, det vil si å oppnå 
utslippsmålene på en kostnadseffektiv måte, og som 
også er politisk mulig å gjennomføre. Norge er et land 
som må jobbe hardt for å innfri sine forpliktelser. Vår 
studie antyder at Norges klimapolitikk har lagt vekt på 
en internasjonal løsning, hvor bare en moderat 
kostnadseffektivitet er oppnådd innenlands. En 
åpenbar årsak til dette er at en internasjonal løsning 
har lavere kostnader. Norge kan få ”politiske 
kostnader” ved en slik løsning i form av kritikk fra  
miljøorganisasjoner og andre land. I den nærmeste 
framtid er det liten grunn til å forvente stor entusiasme 
for klimaproblemet blant folk flest eller i mange av 
verdens stater. Derfor ønsker de, akkurat som Norge, å 
gjennomføre reduksjoner av klimagassutslipp så billig 
som mulig. Dette kan innebære en utstrakt bruk av 
internasjonal kvotehandel, mens det blir kompromisser 
med kostnadseffektiviteten innenlands for å gjøre 
klimapolitikken politisk gjennomførbar. 
   
Abstract: There are considerable differences between 
developed countries as to how difficult it will be to 
meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
‘High-cost abatement countries’ are particularly 
interesting as they can be seen as ‘test-cases’ for other 
nations in more ambitious climate policy agreements. 
We assume that a country’s objective is to develop an 
efficient climate policy, achieving cost effectiveness 
and environmental effectiveness, and that also is 
politically feasible. Norway is among the countries 
that will have a hard time in meeting their obligations. 
Our study suggests that Norway’s climate policy has 
emphasized an international approach, whereas the 
domestic performance on cost effectiveness has been 
more moderate. An obvious reason for this is the 
lower cost associated with the international approach. 
A ‘political cost’ associated with such a policy can be 
criticism from environmental NGOs and other 
countries. At least in the near term there is little reason 
to expect ‘climate enthusiasm’ from the public or 
many countries of the world. Therefore, just like 
Norway, they will want emissions reductions carried 
out as cheaply as possible, which could imply 
extensive international quota trading, whereas 
compromises with regard to cost effectiveness are 
struck at the domestic scene for political feasibility 
reasons. 
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1 Introduction 
There are considerable differences between countries as to how difficult it will be to meet 
their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. So far, the developing countries have no ‘hard’ 
commitments whatsoever. For the Economies in Transition (EIT countries), it will take small 
or no efforts to meet their commitments due to the recession in their economies during the 
1990s. For some OECD countries, it will not take too much effort either. Major emitters like 
the UK and Germany will not have to take major steps because of ‘fortunate circumstances’ 
unrelated to climate policies.  Moreover, the world’s largest emitter, the US, has rejected the 
Kyoto Protocol altogether. That is, from a global perspective, and climate change is a truly 
global problem, few countries will have a hard time in meeting their obligations. These ‘high-
cost abatement countries’, however, are particularly interesting as they can be seen as ‘test-
cases’ for other nations further down the road. Norway belongs to this category of countries.   
Since the adoption of the Climate Convention (UNFCCC) in 1992, most countries’ climate 
policies have consisted of two components: a) domestic abatement measures, if any and b) the 
elaboration of negotiation positions under the international climate negotiations. When the 
high costs of reducing emissions in Norway was realized, cost effectiveness (reduce 
emissions at the lowest cost possible) became the motto of Norwegian climate policy. In 
addition to be a ‘high cost abatement country’, as the world’s third largest oil exporter, 
Norway will be hit hard by a climate regime that leads to less demand for petroleum products.  
Applying a narrow interest-based approach suggests that Norway would be opposed to any 
kind of climate regime, but this has not been the case.  In fact, Norway has traditionally been 
a pusher to establish an international climate regime. Norway also has a reputation of giving 
high priority to international environmental issues as well as being among ‘the best in class’ 
regarding assistance to developing countries. This may indicate that Norway will stretch 
longer than the average OECD country in adopting domestic climate measures as well as 
considering the interests of the developing countries.  
What is the record of Norwegian climate policy at the domestic and international scene? 
Are there any lessons to be learned, and how do the Norwegian experiences relate to the 
possibilities of achieving more stringent commitments in the climate regime further down the 
road? This last question relates to the question of the relationship between cost effectiveness 
and environmental effectiveness. As we shall show later, the present climate regime scores 
very low in terms of environmental effectiveness. Is increased emphasis on cost effectiveness 
a way to go to increase environmental effectiveness?       
Although it makes intuitive sense to reduce emissions at the lowest costs possible, the 
climate issue is primarily about politics, what is politically feasible to achieve domestically 
and internationally? Even though it would be most cost effective to start reducing emissions 
in many developing countries, this may not be possible politically. Internationally it is 
important that developed countries take the lead on the issue and undertake significant 
domestic measures as well. Powerful interest groups will, however, try to resist such domestic 
policies. What is Norway’s record on this account? Has cost effectiveness been pushed most 
strongly at the international scene or has domestic cost-effective measures also been 
undertaken?  What has been the development concerning the relationship between domestic 
and joint international implementation at the international scene?  Figure 1 illustrates the 
connection between cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness and political feasibility. 
The relations between these criteria are further discussed in section 3. 
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 Cost Environmental
 
Figure 1. Relations between cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness 
and political feasibility.  
In the following section we will deal briefly with the development of the international 
climate regime, focusing especially on the development from focus on domestic emissions 
reductions towards reductions through joint international efforts. We then turn to the relation 
between cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness, and political feasibility and how 
these concepts relate to climate policy and the climate regime. The two sections 4 and 5 then 
deal with the development of the Norwegian climate policy and how to ‘design’ an efficient 
Norwegian climate policy within real world constraints. Section 6 concludes the study with a 
discussion of lessons learned and implications for other countries and the climate regime.   
2 The development of the international climate regime: 
domestic vs. international approach?  
Until the early 1970s climate change was a rather esoteric scientific concern. Green NGOs as 
well as activist scientists played an important role in getting the issue on the international 
political agenda (Agrawala, 1999). The Toronto Conference of the Atmosphere in 1988 
proved to be a milestone in the history of international climate policy for at least three 
reasons.1 First, the target and timetables approach was introduced. Second, the developed 
countries were called on to take the lead on the issue. Third, it was (implicitly) assumed that 
emissions reductions were to be undertaken domestically.  Up until the Toronto Conference, 
states had been absent from the scene, but gradually they moved in and a ‘green beauty 
contest’ emerged, a race to adopt the most ambitious climate policy goals (Andresen and 
Agrawala, 2002). ‘Rich and green’ OECD countries were activists, and the EU soon entered 
the ‘team of pushers’. Why this green enthusiasm? First, from the late 1980s and into the 
early 1990s the opinion in Western Europe was relatively green, arguing for quick action to 
deal with the greenhouse effect as well as a host of other international environmental 
problems. Secondly, although the states entered the scene, at this early stage they were mostly 
represented by ministers of Environment, creating an impression that they were more eager to 
react than what proved to be the case when other and more politically influential ministries 
1 This was a non-governmental conference, but participation was very broad. For details, see Agrawala 
(1999).  
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entered the scene. There was one exception to this pattern: the US, which stressed scientific 
uncertainty as well as high costs of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (Bodansky, 1993). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; The Climate 
Convention) was adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992. Most observers regarded the 
Convention as too weak because no targets and timetables were included, mainly as a result 
of US opposition.2 The main emphasis was still on the need for domestic reductions, but the 
international approach was introduced through the provision opening for joint 
implementation. The main significance of the Convention was that it set the stage for 
developing institutions for learning, information gathering and co-operation between states on 
how to deal with the climate problem over the long term.3 At the first Conference of the 
Parties (COP1) in Berlin in 1995 it was recognized that the developed countries should take 
on stronger commitments, thereby setting the stage for the ‘real negotiations’. This was taken 
a step further at COP2 in Geneva (1996) when the necessity for making the commitments 
legally binding was acknowledged.4 At the third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto in 1997, 
the Kyoto Protocol was adopted and the Annex 1 countries (OECD and EIT) agreed to reduce 
their average aggregate emissions by 5.2% by 2008-2012 compared to the base-year 1990. At 
this crossroad the international dimension was more fully introduced through the adoption of 
the three so-called Kyoto mechanisms (also called flexibility mechanisms): the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), joint implementation, and emissions trading. Although 
some were skeptical to these mechanisms, most observers saw the Kyoto Protocol as a step in 
the right direction. It has also been described as a true compromise as “the US got their 
institutions, the EU got their numbers, the developing countries avoided commitments and 
Japan got some prestige as the host” (Andresen, 1998).   
The relative optimism at Kyoto was soon replaced by pessimism in the subsequent process 
as it became clear that the Parties interpreted the Kyoto Protocol very differently. It was 
believed that agreement was reached through the Bonn Agreement, but it took another 
session, COP7 in late 2001 in Marrakech to conclude this phase of the negotiations.  Thus, 
four years after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, it seems the Parties finally agree on what 
it means. The Kyoto mechanisms are thereby seemingly accepted by all major parties, 
confirming the gradual shift from a domestic to an international approach.  
Although the process after Kyoto has generally been characterized by a weakening of the 
Kyoto commitments, George W. Bush Jr. rejected the Kyoto Protocol shortly after he was 
elected president in 2000. Somewhat paradoxically, while the US drive for a more 
international approach through the flexible mechanisms was resisted by the EU during most 
of the process, after the US de facto left the negotiations, the EU is now embracing the very 
same mechanisms. The developing countries, however, have been more skeptical towards the 
flexible mechanisms. As to the future development of the Protocol, the Parties to the Protocol 
will start negotiations on commitments for the period after 2012 by 2005. The three most 
important issues are likely to be the strength of the commitments, whether the US will join the 
agreement, and to what extent (some) developing countries will take on binding emissions 
limitation commitments.  
2 It may be argued, however, that firm targets and timetables may have been premature in the Climate 
Convention. For an elaboration, see Andresen and Agrawala (2002). 
3 The scientific process was organized within the IPCC, see Skodvin (2001). 
4 Some of the more distinct ‘laggard’ countries did not accept the Ministerial Declaration from Geneva.    
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3 Environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness and 
political feasibility 
Cost effectiveness is a relatively straightforward concept that in a climate policy context 
refers to the minimization of the social cost of meeting a specified emissions abatement 
target. By ‘environmental effectiveness’ we mean the long term ability to ‘solve’ the global 
warming problem, that is to meet the objective of the UNFCCC of “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.5 At the international level, the Kyoto 
Protocol can be interpreted as the climate policy treaty that has been feasible in political 
terms, probably for the large majority of countries in the world.  Political feasibility of 
international environmental agreements deals with what is considered as a fair sharing of 
costs and benefits. 
An effective international climate policy regime is conducive for environmental 
effectiveness.6 But how can the effectiveness of an international environmental regime be 
evaluated? This question has been extensively researched among analysts of international 
regimes over the last decade.7 As indicated above, the ‘true’ indicator of environmental 
effectiveness is whether the regime is able to solve the problem that caused its establishment.   
This indicator is very difficult to apply because of the challenge of controlling for the 
influence of all non-regime factors. It is therefore hard to establish causality between the 
regime and the state of the environmental problem. Another indicator deals with the ability of 
the regime to change the behavior of key target groups in the desired direction. The challenge 
of establishing causality looms large here as well, but careful analysis makes causality 
possible to trace (Miles et al., 2001, Skjærseth, 2000).  A third indicator is to focus on the 
output produced by the regime: rules, regulations and commitments. This tells us less about 
the true effectiveness of the regime, but it can easily be applied and the score here usually 
gives an indication of subsequent ‘true’ effectiveness. How does the emerging climate regime 
relate to these indicators? 
The short but somewhat simplified answer is that “whatever indicators are used to measure 
the effectiveness of the climate regime, it is bound to be low” (Andresen, 2001, p. 129). 
Greenhouse gas emissions have been rising steadily during the decade after its establishment, 
and no rapid turn of the tide is expected so environmental effectiveness is certainly low.8 
There are some signs of behavioral changes in key target groups as a result of the regime. The 
National Reports submitted by the Annex 1 countries show that some actions are undertaken 
by most of them, but usually not sufficient to reduce emissions significantly. There are also 
some actions taken within parts of the international petroleum industry, but the picture is 
mixed (Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2001). Still we can conclude that emissions would have been 
(even) higher in the absence of the climate regime. What about the output produced by the 
regime, the Kyoto Protocol as specified in the Marrakech Accord?  As noted, the Kyoto 
Protocol was characterized as a step in the right direction by most analysts.  Still, in terms of 
solving this problem, it has been described as a first ‘baby step’ (Mahlman, 1997). In this 
perspective the subsequent development shows that the baby is barely on its feet. As the Bonn 
5 This is a general objective that does not specify what concentration levels in the atmosphere this 
means, nor how such levels can be achieved. 
6 Stringent compliance rules can be seen as a prerequisite for an effective regime, see e.g. Hovi and 
Areklett (2002). Compliance issues will not be further discussed in this study.  
7 Some major contributions are Victor et al. (1998), Young (1999), and Miles et al. (2001). 
8 IPCC’s new Special Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC, 2000) shows that global CO2 emissions 
alone have increased by 15% from 1990 to 2000.  
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Accord has been described as a ‘Kyoto-light’, ‘Kyoto Ultra Light’ seems to be an apt 
description of the Marrakech Accord because of the increased allowances for changes in 
carbon stocks and somewhat softer compliance rules. Consider also that 80% of the countries 
of the world have no commitments to reduce emissions as a result of the Kyoto Protocol. 
From a political perspective it is certainly positive that the Kyoto Protocol will probably be in 
force within a year or two. Still, even if the Kyoto Protocol is perfectly implemented it will 
only have a marginal effect on global greenhouse gas emissions (Hagem and Holtsmark, 
2001). 
After these sobering remarks, some more positive elements should be noted. Reaching an 
agreement between some 180 nations of the world is a remarkable achievement considering 
the scientific and political complexity of the issue and the somewhat distant and uncertain 
nature of the threat. Given this extremely ‘malign’ problem structure, it is not realistic to 
expect much more in terms of results than have been achieved in this time span (Miles et al., 
2001). It is important that the main institutional architecture to deal with this problem is 
finally in place, although some argue it may be too complex (Bodansky, 2001). Still, much 
tougher measures have to be adopted by many more actors in the next commitment period if 
the international society is to be able to deal more effectively with this problem also in 
environmental terms. How can the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime be 
enhanced?  The easy answer is of course that developed countries must start to take the 
problem more seriously and implement stronger abatement measures. So far few countries 
have been willing to do so and more effort is certainly needed in a long-term perspective. A 
first more realistic, but still difficult, start would be to pursue domestic cost-effective policies 
and in particular utilize the elements of cost effectiveness that is inherent in the Kyoto 
Protocol to show that they work. If these ‘baby-steps’ cannot be effectively utilized, chances 
of ‘real’ effectiveness further down the road is slim.            
Cost effectiveness means achieving the Kyoto Protocol target at the lowest social cost 
possible. At the national level, this requires that the marginal mitigation cost is equalized 
across sectors and over time, where all companies and households are exposed to the same 
regulation level (e.g. the same tax rate on greenhouse gas emissions). At the international 
level, cost effectiveness requires that the marginal mitigation cost is equalized across the 
participating countries. This can be achieved through the Kyoto mechanisms since they create 
an international market with one quota price per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent.9 A 
straightforward way of linking the national and international level is to allow companies and 
other private or public entities to trade both at the national and international market. 
Furthermore, cost effectiveness requires that the administrative burden of the implementation 
system be small to avoid putting excessive transaction costs on companies and households. In 
a dynamic perspective, a policy is efficient if it gives incentives to develop and use new 
technologies, and if it stimulates entry of new, efficient companies and the exit of inefficient 
companies. There can be some trade-off between a short-term climate policy involving 
purchase of large volumes of cheap emission quotas from e.g. Russia, and a more long-term 
(dynamic) perspective that would prescribe a larger share of domestic measures to give 
stronger incentives to develop more efficient and carbon-free energy technologies. 
Furthermore, the climate policy must be flexible to be able to adjust in the case of exogenous 
changes taking place in the future (Xepapadeas, 1997). Another important feature is the 
ability to monitor emissions and bring violators back in line through enforcement (op. cit.). 
9  Due to some differences between emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean 
Development Mechanism, the market could be segregated into three markets where prices may differ 
somewhat. 
 
 
 
5
CICERO Working Paper 2002:03  
 The feasibility of ambitious climate agreements 
 
 
                                                     
The cost-effectiveness ideals have to be seen in light of what is politically feasible (see the 
intersection area in Figure 1). Domestically, climate policy and its implications in terms of 
total mitigation cost and distribution of these costs must be considered to be reasonably fair to 
be acceptable for the major target groups, particularly companies and households, in order to 
secure effective implementation. Various distortions from the ideal can be expected, 
depending upon the economic and political strength of the target groups. Internationally, the 
cost-effective ideals have been tempered especially in relation to the perceptions and demands 
from the developing countries and some ‘green groups’. They have tended to see the 
flexibility mechanisms as a smart way on part of the developed countries to buy themselves 
out of the problem of high costs of domestic emissions reductions.  
This dilemma is also present in Norwegian climate policy: How does the combination of 
being a ‘high cost abatement country’ in favor of cost effectiveness square with the ambition 
of being an environmental pusher and consideration for the interests of the developing 
countries? 
4 Norwegian climate policy 1987–2001/2 
4.1 From pusher to pragmatist   
In 1983 the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was appointed chairman of 
the World Commission on Environment and Development. The so-called Brundtland Report, 
published in 1987, singled out climate change as a major international problem. Norway’s 
high international profile continued over the next years, manifested both at the Hague 
Ministerial Conference in 1989 and the so-called Bergen Conference in 1990.10 The 
Norwegian government officially expressed an ambition to be a frontrunner in the process of 
establishing an international climate regime.11 Norway was also the first country to adopt a 
unilateral target of stabilizing emissions at 1989 levels by the year 2000, and was among the 
first to introduce a CO2 tax.12 In short, Norway was a true pusher in this early pre-negotiation 
phase (Andresen and Butenschøn, 2001).  
During the initial period of ‘green enthusiasm,’ questions of the potential economic costs 
involved were more or less absent from the discussion. In this early ‘visionary stage,’ climate 
change was seen as a global environmental problem that needed to be addressed, with little 
emphasis on practical implications. This changed when new and powerful political and 
economic domestic actors entered the scene, introducing new decision premises. First, it was 
argued that the best contribution Norway could make to reduce global CO2 emissions was to 
export natural gas that could replace some of the far more polluting coal, the most important 
energy source of most Eastern European countries: “replacing coal with gas would do far 
more to preserve the environment than individual, domestic action”.13 Secondly, there was an 
increasing understanding that whatever climate regime was introduced, it would be very 
costly for Norway. This is supported by a survey of selected OECD countries (Torvanger et 
al., 1996), in which Norway is identified as a country with low energy-related CO2 emissions 
10 Norway played an active role from the late 1970s in trying to reduce sulphur emissions from the UK 
and Central European countries that caused acidification of Norwegian lakes and ecosystems, and thus 
favoured bilateral or multilateral agreements to meet this end. 
11 See Stortingsmelding (1989). 
12 Norway was, however, not able to meet the emission stabilization target. 
13 The Minister of Oil and Energy of the Conservative Government, see Arbeiderbladet (1990).  
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relative to total emissions, population, and GDP.14 This is mainly because of Norway’s 
special situation with 70 percent of its stationary energy demand covered by emission-free 
renewable energy sources (mostly hydropower), and hydropower supplying 99 percent of the 
electricity consumption. Furthermore, Norway has a large transport sector due to its 
geography, where emission abatement is costly. This, combined with already high taxes, for 
instance on emissions from offshore activities, implies that the cheapest measures to reduce 
emissions are likely to have been carried out already. These circumstances make it more 
costly for Norway to reduce GHG emissions than most other OECD countries. These factors 
pointed towards stronger reliance on an international approach. Business and industry, the 
main ministries, and the main political parties all argued for this view. The Ministry of 
Environment and the green NGOs, both very influential in the initial phase, were the losers in 
this struggle as they continued to stress the prominence of domestic measures to curb 
emissions. In short, economic pragmatism won over ‘green idealism’ (Andresen and 
Butenschøn, 2001). 
This is also evident when analyzing the CO2 tax that was introduced in 1991. The CO2 tax 
has been the most important policy tool for reducing emissions in Norway, and currently 
covers 64% of the total CO2 emissions in Norway (compared to 60% in 1992), or 47% of the 
total GHG emissions. The tax has been placed on goods such as gasoline, mineral oil, coal, 
coke and natural gas. However, the tax rate did not correspond to the carbon content of the 
fossil fuels, and sectors such as air transport, the process industry, and the cement industry 
were exempted. These exemptions were based on the tradition of supporting a broad 
residential and employment pattern through supporting cornerstone industries in small 
societies and the concern for international competitiveness (Bretteville and Søfting, 2000). In 
February 1992, the environmental tax committee pointed out that a total of 40% of the CO2 
emissions were exempted from taxation. This was not consistent with the principle of cost 
effectiveness, which prescribes that all sectors be subject to the same rate of taxation. Then in 
1996, the Green Tax Commission published its report. Prior to the publication of this report, it 
became known that there was substantial internal disagreement, largely about whether carbon 
emissions from industries exempted from taxation should be taxed. A minority of the 
commission wanted voluntary agreements whereas the majority was in favor of introducing a 
carbon tax. 
With increasing controversy over the making of Norwegian climate policy, it gradually 
turned into a ‘high politics’ issue.15 The Prime Minister herself intervened in the work of the 
Green Tax Commission, and thereby the minority view prevailed. There were strong political 
reactions to this intervention (Skjærseth-Nielsen, 1998). The ‘high politics’ nature of climate 
policy was highlighted in 1999 when the Centrist government had to step down as a result of 
strong conflicts over its climate policy.16  
14 The countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA. These countries were chosen according to size within the 
OECD and as representatives of groups and geographical regions within the OECD (Torvanger et al., 
1996). 
15 In contrast to more traditional environmental issues, the climate issue is just as much about energy 
and trade as environment.  
16 The Centrist government wanted a stricter regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new gas-
fired power plants but was defeated in Parliament, resulting in a Labor party government taking office. 
The issue of new gas fired power plants is still a very ‘hot’ issue on the Norwegian political agenda.    
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4.2 International consequences 
The more pragmatic climate policy has also had profound consequences on the international 
scene. As noted, in the initial phase Norway was among the main pushers for strong 
commitments, but this gradually changed with the approach of the 1992 Rio Summit. It was 
not considered ‘progressive’ (although quite creative) when Norway introduced the ideas of 
flexibility instruments into the negotiations at the end of 1991 under the title ‘Joint 
Implementation’ (Michaelowa and Dutschke, 2000).17 Norway proposed that cost 
effectiveness could be increased by separating the emissions targets from the method of 
abatement – in other words, that countries could choose to implement measures domestically 
or jointly on a bilateral or regional basis. The Ministry of Environment went as far as 
announcing that Norway would not sign any agreement without a joint implementation option 
(Tenfjord, 1995).18 During the subsequent negotiation process, Norway argued for 
differentiated commitments and supported binding commitments in a protocol, common 
quantitative emission commitments for groups of countries, a comprehensive approach 
including all six greenhouse gases as well as sinks, international harmonization of measures, 
and financial assistance to developing countries. 
These policies implied that Norway got new and – compared to the initial period – 
unexpected allies. While Norway had been on the pusher team with the ‘small and green’ EU 
countries as well as the EU, this changed as Kyoto was drawing closer. Norway became a 
member of the informal JUSSCANNZ group of countries, led by the US and generally 
considered a ‘laggard’ group, as they were reluctant to take on domestic commitments and 
stressed the need for a flexible cost-effective international approach.19 Although the CO2 tax 
has been the backbone of Norwegian climate policy measures, the idea of tradable emissions 
quotas has also been discussed, and it received political interest after COP3 in Kyoto. A 
Norwegian quota commission was established, and it released its report in December 1999.20 
A system that would cover about 90% of Norwegian GHG emissions was recommended, and 
a majority further recommended that all sources should pay market price for the quotas. One 
part of the minority recommended that the yet untaxed emissions should be granted free 
permits (Bretteville and Søfting, 2000). The alternative option to meet Norway’s Kyoto 
commitment is to use the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol.21 
One of the major conflicts after Kyoto has been whether or not to introduce a quantified 
cap on emissions emission trading, that is, whether or not to restrict emissions trading to meet 
the requirement that Annex I countries use the flexibility instruments to meet only part of 
their commitments (also known as the “supplementarity” requirement). Again, Norway sided 
with the US and the rest of the so-called Umbrella Group against the EU, arguing against any 
such quantified cap since it would increase the quota price, reducing the cost-effectiveness of 
the flexibility mechanisms, and thus be in conflict with the agreement adopted in Kyoto. The 
issue was settled at the second part of COP6 in Bonn in July 2001 when the EU gave up its 
proposal for a quantified cap on the use of the flexibility mechanism, which is consistent with 
17 This concept has since been modified and is known as ‘Joint Implementation,’ one of the three 
flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol.  
18 Cited in Andresen and Butenschøn (2001). 
19 JUSSCANNZ is an acronym composed of the initials of participating countries, which are Japan, the 
United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand. In 1998, Russia and Ukraine 
joined the group and Switzerland left, and the term was changed to the ‘Umbrella Group’.  
20 NOU (2000). 
21 In addition to emissions trading, joint implementation and the CDM, Annex I countries can also form 
“bubbles”, such as the EU-bubble, where the countries have differentiated obligations, but where total 
emissions reductions are in line with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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the Norwegian policies since this supplementarity requirement is only defined in qualitative 
terms.22 
Siding with the ‘grey’ US against the ‘green’ EU – with the other Nordic countries except 
Iceland – has clearly posed a major policy dilemma for Norway. Criticism has been hard from 
the environmental NGOs. This criticism may have had some effect, as Norway more recently 
has been able to maneuver itself more in the direction of acting as a broker between the two 
main contestants. On the important land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) issue, 
Norway has sided with the EU, against most of the Umbrella Group members.23 After the US 
opted out of the Protocol, the decision of whether to follow the EU or the US lost its 
relevance as it was never a policy option for the small, internationalist Norway to join forces 
with the US in such a move. 
4.3 Costs of meeting the Kyoto commitments 
Norway is one of three countries that through the Kyoto Protocol are allowed to increase their 
emissions, as it is committed to limiting its GHG emissions in the period 2008–2012 to 1% 
over its 1990 emissions. However, national circumstances and experience shows that Norway 
is likely to have difficulties in limiting its GHG emissions. The stabilization goal was 
officially abandoned in 1995 as GHG emissions increased steadily. From 1990 to 2000, the 
total GHG emissions increased by 6% while the CO2 emissions increased by 17% (Statistics 
Norway, 2002). This rise is mainly caused by increased gas production and associated 
pipeline transportation, an increased share of oil extraction from older oil fields (which 
requires more energy use), and a steady rise in the transportation sector. Estimates by the 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) and the Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
indicate that the total GHG emissions in Norway in 2010 could be 24% higher than 1990 
emissions if no measures are taken. Meeting the Kyoto reduction target would then require 
annual reductions of about 12 Mt CO2 equivalents. Plans to build two gas-fired power plants 
could further increase the GHG emissions by at least 2 Mt CO2 (SFT, 2000).24 
An important basis for Norway’s climate policy is information about domestic marginal 
GHG abatement costs. A study by the SFT (SFT, 2000) covering all sectors and the most 
important emissions sources estimates the costs of more than 70 measures to reduce 
Norwegian GHG emissions in 2010. The marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve in the SFT 
study, as shown in Figure 2, includes options of reducing emissions by approximately 2 Mt 
CO2 equivalents at no cost (no-regrets).25 The study finds that a reduction of 6 Mt CO2 
equivalents (about half of Norway’s reduction target) can be achieved at a cost lower than 
approximately 22 USD/t CO2 equivalent.26,27 This includes emissions reductions from the 
22 The text now reads “That the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and 
domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of efforts made by each Party included in 
Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, 
paragraph 1.” (See UN, 2001). 
23 Given some limitations a country can count carbon sequestration in forests and agricultural soils as 
part of meeting its Kyoto Protocol commitments. 
24 There are plans to build additional gas-fired power plants that will increase the GHG emissions even 
further. 
25 Estimating marginal abatement costs will never be entirely correct, as there are many factors that can 
cause uncertainty. The SFT study concludes that there might be errors in the data basis, and some 
measures are not included due to insufficient data, such as measures regarding CH4 and N2O from 
agriculture and carbon sequestration in forests. 
26 Costs are originally stated in NOK, an exchange rate of NOK 9.0 for USD 1 has been used to convert 
to USD. 
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process industry, other process emissions, stationary combustion, road traffic and other 
mobile sources. Another 5 Mt CO2 equivalents can be abated domestically for less than 45 
USD/t CO2 equivalent.28 
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Figure 2. Marginal abatement cost curve for Norway in 2010. (Only measures 
with costs lower than 111 USD are included.) Source: SFT (2000). 
4.4 Reducing costs: pushing for Joint Implementation 
Since it will be very costly to reduce GHG emissions using only domestic measures, Norway 
has not only supported joint implementation in principle. Norway has also been among the 
most active countries in promoting cross-boundary emissions reductions, and has already 
gained experience from the pilot phase for JI, ‘Activities Implemented Jointly’ (AIJ). Table 1 
summarizes the Norwegian-supported AIJ projects that have been accepted, approved or 
endorsed by the designated national authorities. 
Table 1. Norwegian-supported AIJ projects. Source: Stortingsmelding (2001). 
Host country Project Project type 
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Sustainable Energy Management  Energy Efficiency  
China Thermal Power Plant in Henan Province  Energy Efficiency  
Mexico High Efficiency Lighting (ILUMEX)  Energy Efficiency  
India Integrated Agriculture Demand-Side Management  Energy Efficiency  
Costa Rica Reforestation and Forest Conservation  Forest reforestation  
Poland Coal to Gas Conversion Fuel Switching  
Slovakia Fuel Switch From Fossil Fuels to Bio-Energy  Renewable energy  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
27 Assuming no construction of gas-fired power plants. 
28 For comparison, the Norwegian CO2 tax as of January 1, 2001, for gasoline was USD 34.6/t CO2 
equivalent. 
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Norway’s involvement in the AIJ started with pilot projects that were initiated in 
cooperation with the World Bank in 1993, but also includes bilateral projects.29 The projects 
have a wide geographical distribution and take place within different sectors, but the main 
emphasis has been on energy projects. The project in Costa Rica was the first of its kind and 
involved the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and three Norwegian companies engaged 
in the development of hydropower in the Virilla River. Norway’s first JI project was signed in 
December 2001 with Romania as the host country.30 Norway will be credited about 35,000 
tons CO2 annually for the first commitment period at a cost of about USD 3.3/t CO2. But 
Norway has also been active in the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), which was 
established in 1999. The PCF funds projects that produce GHG emissions reductions 
consistent with the Kyoto Protocol and can be registered with the UNFCCC.31 Additionally, 
one of the companies planning to build one of the gas-fired power plants has been active in 
the early phase of the CDM. The company has an option contract to buy carbon credits from 
an afforestation company, Tree Farms, in Tanzania. 
Summing up, what is the experience of Norway in terms of its ability to pursue a cost-
effective policy and cope with political domestic and international political challenges? 
Analyzing the Norwegian climate policies up to the present reveals a clear distinction 
between the domestic and international approach. Norway has pushed for international 
flexibility to ensure international cost effectiveness and has already gained valuable 
experience from the AIJ. This has been done rather consistently although varying 
governments have had somewhat differing views on the appropriate blend between domestic 
and international measures. This consistent strategy has had some costs in terms of criticism, 
primarily from domestic green NGOs. Domestically, cost effectiveness has been given less 
priority as concerns for such as residential pattern and international competitiveness have 
been regarded as more important and the positions of major interest groups opposing taxes 
have prevailed. 
5  Designing a climate policy for Norway  
So far, the international level has been the most important arena for the climate change 
problem, as the making of a global regime that would set rules and commitments for the 
countries of the world has been the main challenge. Since the Climate Convention countries 
have been encouraged to introduce measures to abate emissions, but there have been no hard 
commitments apart from the reporting system. When the Kyoto Protocol is in force within a 
year or two, more focus will be needed on the domestic level to study the will and ability of 
Annex 1 countries to ‘deliver’. The challenge for Norway is to design its future climate policy 
in light of national circumstances and different international scenarios. In line with the 
discussion of an effective climate policy in section 3 (see Figure 1), the climate policy should 
be cost effective, support environmental effectiveness and be feasible in political terms. Can 
this be done, and if so how? 
The strategies for Norwegian climate policies in the short- and long-term were outlined in a 
recent White Paper (Stortingsmelding, 2001). The CO2 tax will still be the main policy tool up 
to 2008, but there is also room for voluntary agreements. A national emission trading system 
will be established in 2005, covering those industries that are exempted from the CO2 tax. 
From 2008 the national system will be linked to international emissions trading under the 
29 The AIJ projects in Costa Rica, China and Slovakia are bilateral projects.  
30 Ministry of Environment (2001). 
31 Companies and governments receive a pro rate share of the emissions reductions. Norway is 
represented as one out of six governments and by two out of 17 private companies.  
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Kyoto Protocol.  From the same year the tradable permit system will replace the CO2 tax as 
the main policy tool, implying that (most of) the remaining industries will be included in the 
emissions trading system.  
The major dimensions for designing the Norwegian policy can be divided into domestic 
and international issues, and short-term and long-term perspectives, see Table 2 below. By 
‘short-term’ we mean the period until the end of the first commitment period (2012) under the 
Kyoto Protocol. By ‘long-term’ we mean to the period from 2013 until 2022, which covers 
two future 5-year commitment periods under the Protocol. For each of these combinations of 
time and issue area, there are different alternatives and thus choices to be made. Although 
domestic constraints are important, as will be demonstrated below, developments at the 
international level are crucial in deciding the main framework for future Norwegian climate 
policy. We have chosen to focus on three key aspects: the future participation of the USA, 
developing countries and the ambition level of future agreements. These are outlined as the 
two climate policy scenarios ‘Kyoto weak’ and ‘Kyoto strong’. 
In the ‘Kyoto weak’ scenario it is assumed that the ambition level of the present Kyoto 
Protocol is more or less continued after 2012, that the USA continues to reject the Protocol, 
and that developing countries refuse to take on binding commitments to limit their GHG 
emissions. In the ‘Kyoto strong’ scenario the ambition level is strengthened with the aim to 
reach a long-term global target, for instance stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at some specified level, and that the USA and the most affluent developing 
countries take on binding commitments to limit their emissions of GHG. 
Considerable attention should be given to a climate policy that is designed to be robust, and 
thus will be able to handle different future developments as smoothly as possible. The 
following discussion focuses on the ‘Kyoto strong’ scenario, since this is the most 
challenging climate policy future for Norway. This scenario is also a prerequisite for a more 
effective climate regime. The consequences of a ‘Kyoto weak’, which are significantly 
smaller than for ‘Kyoto strong’, are only discussed when most relevant. 
Let us consider the issues in sequence starting with the short-term and domestic level, 
before moving on to the international level and long-term perspectives. 
Table 2. Important dimensions for designing an efficient climate policy for 
Norway.Table 2 
Time horizon 
 
Geographical level 
Short-term 
(until 2012) 
Long-term 
(beyond 2012) 
Domestic Wide or narrow national 
implementation 
Political feasibility 
Policy tool choice 
Development of new GHG-efficient 
technologies 
CO2 capture and storage technologies 
International Use of the Kyoto mechanisms 
Dependency on other countries’ 
climate policy 
US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
New emissions limitation targets 
American ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol? 
Commitments by developing countries 
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5.1 Short-term domestic policy 
A major concern in the implementation of a cost-effective domestic climate policy is to 
involve as many economic sectors and activities as possible so that all possible abatement 
measures are considered. More specifically, the climate policy price signal should be 
harmonized in all sectors so that the cost of releasing a ton of GHGs to the atmosphere is the 
same. If all sectors face the same price signal, then they have the same incentive to carry out 
abatement measures until the marginal cost is the same, thus securing cost-minimization. As 
part of a cost-effective solution, companies in a tradable permit system can buy or sell 
permits.  There can nevertheless be measurement and control cost considerations that make a 
system covering all emissions too costly and therefore infeasible.  
The coverage of a control system for GHG emissions may be further constrained by 
political feasibility concerns. Earlier studies have shown that the industry sectors most 
exposed to climate policy costs (e.g. a green tax) have successfully lobbied the politicians and 
have thus been rewarded with exemptions from regulation or lower tax rates (see Kasa, 1999). 
In many cases there has been an alliance with local politicians and labor unions since many 
industry plants in Norway that are heavy emitters of GHG are situated in rural districts with 
few employment alternatives. Obviously the political feasibility issue will be much less 
pressing in a ‘Kyoto weak’ scenario since the economic consequences would be much 
smaller. 
Market-based policy tools such as taxes and tradable permits can induce a cost-effective 
solution. With regard to political feasibility, the net cost implications for firms depend more 
on how the policy tools are implemented, for instance if (some of) the tax revenue is recycled 
to the firms, or if permits are auctioned to the firms or given for free based on a 
grandfathering allocation scheme. As noted, the carbon tax of 1991 mainly covered sectors 
not exposed to foreign competition. Norway is now considering an early domestic emissions 
trading system covering sectors that are exempted from the carbon tax, possibly starting in 
2005, and linking up to emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008. This raises the 
question of the best interface between tax and permits in a mixed system. In the longer term, 
an obvious alternative given international emissions trading is to expand tradable permits to 
all sectors of the economy. The choice between an emissions trading system and a mixed 
system should be governed by practical considerations so that the system with the lowest 
administrative costs is preferred. For households and small companies, emissions trading may 
involve disproportionately high administrative costs, and in this case a tax could be 
preferable. In the case of gasoline, a solution could be to introduce emissions permit 
obligations for oil companies, where the additional cost is passed on to consumers by 
increasing the price. 
5.2 Short-term considerations at international level 
Moving on to the international level, Figure 2 indicates that the cost of abatement for Norway 
increases significantly after reducing only a few Mt CO2 equivalents, which demonstrates the 
cost-saving potential for Norway of utilizing the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Therefore the international quota price is important for determining the extent to 
which measures within Norway will be pursued. A low quota price implies less domestic 
measures, whereas a high quota price implies more domestic abatement. The cost-saving 
potential of the flexibility mechanisms can be increased by securing rules and institutions that 
keep transaction costs as low as possible, and by making the CDM projects attractive (to gain 
access to a large volume of inexpensive CDM quotas). 
The recent American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to result in a lower quota 
price than earlier expected. A study by Hagem and Holtsmark (2001) projects that the 
expected international quota price could be reduced from USD 15 per ton CO2 equivalent 
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with US participation to USD 5 per ton CO2 equivalent without US participation. The large 
inclusion of LULUCF activities will also most likely push the quota prices downward. This 
will most likely result in less domestic action in Norway. Given this marginal abatement cost 
curve, assuming a need to reduce projected emissions by 12 Mt CO2 equivalents to meet the 
Kyoto target and assuming a quota price of 5 USD per ton, the cost-effective solution would 
be to buy quotas for 9 Mt CO2 equivalents abroad. This means that 75% of the emissions 
abatement would be met through purchase of quotas abroad. If gas-fired power plants are 
constructed, this figure would rise accordingly by 2-7 Mt CO2 equivalents, depending on the 
number of plants constructed.  International emissions trading at such a volume could easily 
be seen as violating the Kyoto Protocol’s provision that the use of the mechanisms be 
supplemental to domestic action.  Consequently Norway is likely to be in a situation where 
the cost-effective solution is not feasible for political reasons, since Norway risks being 
criticized by other Parties or environmental NGOs if a large share of its Kyoto target is met 
through purchase of quotas on the international market.  
Since Norway is a small, open economy, the country is particularly vulnerable to climate 
policy implementation in countries that are major trading partners. Even if the national 
emission targets are defined by the Kyoto Protocol, each country itself must design its own 
policy tools and determine how different sectors will be affected by the regulation. If other 
countries choose to (partly) exempt a certain industry from the regulation, this could imply a 
competitive disadvantage for the same industry in Norway if this meets the full climate policy 
regulation. The policy choice of the EU –- being the country’s largest trading partner – is of 
particular importance to Norway. The EU is considering a regional emissions trading system 
from 2005. This is a narrow system involving only CO2 from heavy industries, thus 
representing only around 45% of CO2 in the region and no other GHG. To keep the national 
abatement costs down, Norway prefers a wide system, which conflicts with EU’s strategy. To 
increase the trading area and gain experience with early trading, there are benefits for the 
Norwegian emissions trading system to link up with EU’s system. To make this possible, 
Norway may be forced to introduce a more narrow trading system than it would otherwise 
prefer. In the ‘Kyoto weak’ scenario, Norway’s vulnerability to other countries’ climate 
policies is reduced since the smaller ambition level significantly reduces the economic 
consequences. 
A major effect of the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is a substantially 
reduced environmental effectiveness of the first commitment period. According to Hagem 
and Holtsmark (2001), global emission reductions compared to business as usual in 2008-12 
are reduced from 5.5% to 0.9% as a result of the US position. This demonstrates the 
importance for the climate policy agreement of engaging the USA in the climate policy effort 
as soon as possible, notwithstanding the political importance of the USA as the only 
remaining superpower and the world’s largest GHG emitter. Under all circumstances, the 
USA will probably undertake a national climate strategy that to some extent limits its 
emissions compared to a ‘business as usual’ scenario (Agrawala and Andresen, 2001). 
However, the ambition level of the new climate change policy launched by the Bush 
administration in February 2002 seems very close to ‘business as usual’ (see The White 
House, 2002). This policy plan is based on intensity targets (emissions divided by gross 
domestic product) and voluntary measures. 
5.3 Domestic policy options in the long-term  
To reduce long-term abatement costs, Norway could commit to a technology and industry 
strategy for the future where green and carbon-free energy technologies dominate. During the 
last few decades, Denmark has developed wind energy technologies (wind mills) into a large 
export industry and Sweden has developed biomass energy to take a sizeable share of the 
national energy supply, whereas Norway has done much less to develop these and other 
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renewable energy sources. For instance, and in spite of more than 20 years of public support 
programs, Norway’s operating wind capacity represents only some 0.03 % of total power 
production (Christiansen, 2002, p. 239). Kolshus et al. (2000) highlight a number of climate-
friendly energy technologies that could have great potential if further developed. The most 
interesting energy technologies for Norway are combined-cycle turbines, fuel cells, combined 
heat and power, heat pumps, small-scale hydroelectricity, wind energy, solar energy 
(photovoltaic and solar-thermal plants), and biomass energy. Should a ‘Kyoto weak’ scenario 
materialize, the incentives to develop new technologies would be reduced. 
A particularly interesting option for Norway is to develop competitive carbon dioxide 
capture and storage technologies and deposit CO2 in (partly) depleted oil and gas reservoirs or 
other geological formations. In fact, the world’s first commercial scale system for CO2 
capture and deposits in a saline aquifer was implemented on the Sleipner West field on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf in 1996 (Christiansen, 2001, p. 508). Christiansen (2001) has 
coined this a major or radical technological innovation, in that it represents a technological 
discontinuity in upstream activities that offers considerable potential for mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions. Currently about 1 million tons of CO2 is injected annually. Besides 
its potential impact on abatement strategies, a breakthrough involving wider applications of 
this abatement technology would also reduce the pressure from an international climate policy 
agreement on fossil fuel revenues. A prerequisite for such technology development is 
acceptance for CO2 capture and storage as a climate policy measure under the Kyoto Protocol. 
5.4 Long-term policy options at international level 
According to the Kyoto Protocol, negotiations on new emissions limitation targets are to 
commence by 2005. So far no targets after 2012 have been determined. A first issue is to 
determine a target for the participating countries, e.g. in terms of maximum concentration 
levels of GHGs in the atmosphere. A second issue is to agree on an emissions path consistent 
with the long-term target. A third issue is when the more affluent developing countries should 
take on binding commitments to limit their GHG emissions. Also, in this regard, the challenge 
to include the USA in the agreement is of vital importance for the survival of the Kyoto 
Protocol. A fourth issue is to distribute the emissions limitation and abatement targets among 
the participating countries. For Norway and other participating countries, the global ambition 
level and national targets negotiated are major determinants for future emission abatement 
costs. Being a small country, Norway’s ability to influence the outcome of the negotiations as 
a point of departure is very limited.  At any rate, global targets and burden-sharing 
implications of future global climate policy agreements will be constrained by the consensus 
requirement, although it can be disregarded under certain circumstances.  There is also limited 
room for sanctions if a country feels unjustly treated and chooses to pull out of the agreement. 
Summing up, based on the discussion above, Norway’s main option for an efficient climate 
policy in the short-term is to choose a wide national implementation strategy that builds on 
market-based policy tools and seeks collaboration and harmonization with other countries 
with respect to policy choices made as Norway has limited options for choosing more 
independent policy directions. Policy harmonization with other countries will soften the 
political feasibility constraints on Norwegian climate policy. This may seem like an easy 
recipe for a cost-effective policy, but there are bound to be difficult challenges and trade-offs. 
On the one hand, lobbying is expected if taxes are expanded or emission permits have to be 
bought. On the other hand, national and international protests are anticipated if the extent of 
trading is too high. Balancing these concerns is necessary but not easy, and a consequence 
might be that a cost-effective solution is not achievable. The long term perspective is bound 
to be (even) more uncertain. Suffice it to mention that there are good opportunities to reduce 
abatement costs through investments in new climate-friendly technologies. Internationally, it 
is a paradox that the absence of the US in the future climate regime will be beneficial to 
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Norway in the sense that quota prices will remain lower, but on the other hand environmental 
effectiveness will be reduced. 
6  Conclusions and lessons learned 
What can the experience of Norway as a ‘test-case’ tell us about the feasibility of ambitious 
future international climate policy agreements? We think that the Norwegian case could be 
illustrative for the future developments of climate policies in other nations as well. Many 
countries have so far been more or less free-riders, but this is bound to change further down 
the road if the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime is to increase. As long as the 
costs of damage abatement are relatively high and concentrated while the damage is diffuse, 
uncertain and long term, there is little reason to expect ‘climate enthusiasm’ from the public 
or many countries of the world. Therefore, just like Norway, they will want emissions 
reductions carried out as cheaply as possible. 
Norway has been much better at pursuing cost effectiveness at the international level than 
domestically. Various Norwegian governments have pushed for the elaboration and 
acceptance of the Kyoto mechanisms and have also pursued joint implementation projects in 
the pilot phase. Norway can also be expected to be strongly involved in international 
emissions trading as a net importer since there is a substantial cost-saving potential. 
Considering its rather ‘progressive’ North-South policy, Norway will probably also be 
actively involved in CDM projects. That is, the international dimension is already strong in 
Norwegian climate policy, and it can be expected to increase further in the future. The cost-
effectiveness record is bleaker on the domestic side, although a CO2 tax has been operative 
for more than a decade, longer than has been the case in most OECD countries. But because 
of interest-group lobbying and other political considerations, there are many important 
exceptions so that the cost effectiveness is significantly reduced.  
Although green enthusiasm has waned somewhat, Norway still has a fairly high 
environmental profile, a high profile towards developing countries and is also among the 
wealthiest countries of the world.  Why, then, the insistence on the international approach and 
the more moderate domestic performance? The most obvious and maybe also correct answer 
is that the international approach costs less money and some of the problem are pushed up 
from the domestic to the international level. Coined in more positive terms, the international 
approach can lead to more emissions reductions for less money, a ‘rational’ approach as this 
is a global, not a domestic problem. This policy cannot, however, be pursued so far that the 
weight on domestic measures becomes too small. For example, it will probably not be 
politically feasible for Norway to purchase 3/4 of its quotas abroad to meet its emissions 
targets, even though this could be the most cost-effective approach – given the estimated low 
quota price resulting from the US rejection of Kyoto. However, the political feasibility 
depends on the sensitivity of Norwegian politicians to the likely criticism from environmental 
NGOs and other Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the case of extensive international emissions 
trading. It may be that the Norwegian case is not representative for other countries. That is, 
others may be willing to take on more costly domestic emissions reductions than Norway has 
been willing to. However, so far there are few indications that such willingness exists.     
The final adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at COP7 may have been a political success, but its 
long-term environmental effectiveness in terms of impact on expected global temperature 
increase is low. Considering the complexity of the issue, this meager result is not surprising. 
So far the trend towards increased reliance on the international flexibility mechanisms over 
time has been strong. A cost-effective international approach along the lines of the Kyoto 
mechanisms represents a first necessary step to demonstrate that the system works. 
Furthermore, future negotiations could aim at package deals where more ambitious emissions 
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abatement targets are combined with extensive use of Kyoto mechanisms that are further 
elaborated. In this way a cost-effective international approach could increase the 
environmental effectiveness of the climate policy regime. 
The flexibility mechanisms are not only important for the Parties to increase cost 
effectiveness. They could also be an effective tool for involving key target groups like 
companies and other private or public entities in emissions mitigation efforts. That is, the 
target groups, usually considered part of the problem, can in this way become part of the 
solution. The experience with the flexibility mechanisms is also crucial in relation to the US 
as well as the developing countries. Whether the US re-enters this process to some extent 
depends upon the workability and experience with the Kyoto mechanisms, as it is highly 
unlikely that the US will join a treaty where the market does not play an essential role. So far, 
the developing countries have been either negative or somewhat skeptical to the flexibility 
mechanisms. It is therefore essential to get the Kyoto mechanisms to work well so that 
‘green’ skeptics and developing countries see that they contribute to real reductions and that 
they are not only a smart way for developed countries to avoid costly domestic emissions 
reductions. 
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Appendix. The Norwegian climate and oil dilemma 
The Norwegian position in climate policy is further complicated by Norway’s role as a large 
oil and gas exporter. The establishment of an international climate policy regime is likely to 
reduce oil and gas prices due to reduced demand and thereby diminish the oil and gas wealth 
of Norway. Bartsch and Müller (2000), Kolshus et al. (2000) and other studies have shown 
that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010 and new commitment periods will 
have significant impacts on the fossil fuel markets. Reduced producer prices will surely affect 
Norway, which was the sixth largest oil producer in 2000 and third only to Saudi Arabia and 
Russia when it came to oil export (OED, 2001a). Norway is the second largest exporter of gas 
to Europe, and it is expected that Norway will have market shares of between 30% and 40% 
in countries such as Germany, France and Belgium (Austvik, 2001). The petroleum sector is 
vital for the Norwegian economy, as it in 2000 accounted for 48% of the export value and 
25% of the country’s aggregate incomes (OED, 2001b). 
Kolshus et al. (2000) examine Norway’s ability to implement an efficient climate policy in 
Norway, given that the markets for fossil fuels are influenced by a climate policy regime. 
Two possible climate policy futures up to 2020 were explored. The first is the Climate 
Stagnation scenario, where the Kyoto Protocol does not enter into force. The second scenario, 
a Kyoto Success scenario, is based on the assumption that the Kyoto Protocol enters into 
force and developing countries are assumed to take on binding commitments through a global 
burden-sharing scheme in a second commitment period after 2012.  The cases of unrestricted 
international emissions trading and no international emissions trading were examined. The 
consequences for Norway were focused on the costs of i) abating domestically and purchasing 
quotas from other countries; and ii) loss of oil and gas export revenues. The analysis shows 
that the costs for Norway of implementing the Kyoto Protocol will be heavily dominated by 
the loss of oil and gas export revenues.  The cost of reduced oil and gas export revenues is 15 
to 18 times greater than the abatement and quota cost in 2010, and 2 to 7 times greater in 
2020.  Holtsmark and Hagem (1998) estimate the implementation cost of the Kyoto Protocol, 
including terms of trade changes in the fossil fuel markets in the case of free emissions 
trading among developed countries, measured as percentage of GDP in 1990. They find that 
Norway has the highest cost at 1.2% of GDP. The estimate is 0.25% for the USA, 0.4% for 
Canada, and 0.2% for Denmark. Since major oil or gas importing countries can benefit from 
lower import prices, Japan turns out with a net gain of 0.1% of GDP. 
This is evidence of the conflicting interests between Norway’s role as a large fossil fuel 
exporter and its ambitions to have a green and climate-friendly image internationally. 
Participating in a climate policy regime will be more costly and make Norway more 
vulnerable to a climate policy agreement than other developed countries due to the relatively 
large loss in oil and gas revenue. However, the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol 
will result in a smaller reduction in oil and gas demand resulting from the implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Hagem and Holtsmark (2001) calculate that the producer oil price is 
reduced by 1.8% with US participation and by 0.4% without US participation.  Similar results 
for the three regional gas markets are a reduction of 0.4 to 4.0% with US participation and 0.1 
to 1.2% without US participation. As shown by Kolshus et al. (2000), the fossil fuel revenue 
loss for Norway due to the Kyoto Protocol dominates the abatement costs and expenses to 
buy quotas by a large margin. If the agreement is later expanded to include the USA and 
(some) developing countries, the effect on fossil fuel markets will be strengthened. Likewise 
the Norwegian revenue loss will be larger. Due to non-participation by the USA and 
developing countries there will be a carbon leakage to these countries since the oil and gas 
consumers in these countries face a lower price than in participating countries. The effect is a 
smaller revenue loss than in the case of global participation. 
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This raises the issue of Norwegian possibilities to influence the oil and gas price to 
compensate for some of the climate policy related loss. In the short to medium term, the gas 
price on the European market and the oil price on the international market could be 
influenced. In this regard, two issues are important when discussing Norway’s opportunity to 
influence the oil and gas revenue loss. The first issue is Norway’s relation to the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose member countries produce about 40% of 
the world’s oil and control more than 77% of the world’s proven oil reserves.  Norway has 
traditionally not followed OPEC’s production level, and did not reduce its oil production in 
1998 when the OPEC decided to reduce its production. OPEC then, at its meeting in Vienna 
on November 14, 2001, decided to reduce its daily production by 1.5 million barrels in 2002. 
However, this cut was contingent on cuts by non-OPEC members (The Economist, 2001). A 
signal of change may now be seen in Norway relation to OPEC as Norway has decided to 
reduce its production by between 100,000 and 200,000 barrels a day. Could this increase 
Norway’s influence on the international oil price?  
The second issue is Norway’s ability to exert influence on the price of natural gas. A gas 
directive from the European Union (EU, 1998) and political processes allow for a more 
liberalized European gas market. This provides the basis for substantial changes and the 
creation of a single market for gas. Norway’s influence on the gas price may be reduced, as 
the companies now must sell their own gas, instead of being channeled through the 
Norwegian sales monopoly (Gassforhandlingsutvalget). Shorter contracts and increased spot 
trading will gradually replace today’s bilateral negotiations. Increased competition and over-
capacity will probably force the prices downward in the short term, but future export potential 
and its costs will be important for the long-term price development. However, Norway will 
still be a dominant owner across all the large gas fields (Austvik, 2001) and may strengthen 
its market position, as there is limited political willingness to increase Dutch export, moderate 
export potential in Algeria, and uncertainties in the Russian production (Sagen, 2001). 
 
